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INTRODUCTION
The major exchange rate depreciation at the beginning of any transition
process, which is followed by years of real appreciation, is a stylised
fact for post-socialist economies moving to the market economy. This
stylised fact is described and interpreted by Wyplosz and Halpern
(1996):
"The actual real exchange rate initially depreciates and overshoots its
equilibrium path so that there is at first sizable undervaluation. Over time
the real exchange rate appreciates for two reasons. First, the initial un-
dervaluation is gradually corrected. Second, the real equilibrium ex-
change rate itself appreciates as a result of the transformation process.
The rate of equilibrium appreciation is higher the more complete is the
market system and the faster capital is accumulated."
Wyplosz and Halpern (1996) also discuss the determinants of the long-
run real exchange rate and the appropriate exchange rate policy during
the process of convergence to the long-run equilibrium.
In Russia, since 1992 the management of the exchange rate was exten-
sively used for the purpose of restraining devaluation and controlling in-
flation. However, a sharp real (and even nominal in the first half of 1995)
appreciation caused a dramatic decrease in the profitability of exports
and made Russian goods less competitive relative to imported goods.
Export effectiveness, calculated by the Central Bank for a representative
basket of goods securing approximately 60% of Russian export value,
became negative. It is not likely that exporters were trading at a loss
even at that time, since domestic costs were not really paid in full due to
non-payments and barter. However, a decline in effectiveness was ap-
parent. On the other hand, the share of imported goods in retail trade
turnover reached approximately 50%.
To stop the real Ruble appreciation, in July 1995 the Central Bank intro-
duced the foreign currency corridor. In 1996 and 1997, the Central
Bank kept the real exchange rate roughly constant.
In 1997, the foreign liabilities of all sectors of the Russian economy in-
creased by US$ 44 billion. Foreign capital inflows to the government
sector constituted US$ 21 billion, to the banking sector — US$ 9 billion,
and to the corporate sector — US$ 14 billion. According to our estima-
tions, almost one-half of the total increase in foreign liabilities was se-
cured by the short-term borrowings of the Government from participants
in the domestic market. Non-resident investments in the GKO/OFZ mar-
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ket through "S"-accounts totaled US$ 11 billion, while the increase in
the foreign liabilities of the banking sector was mainly due to non-
resident investments in the GKO/OFZ market through so-called "grey"
schemes.
In the first half of 1997, huge foreign capital inflows and favourable
world commodity prices made the Central Bank choose between further
real appreciation and mounting international reserves. The "strong" Ru-
ble was often referred to as a bright sign of success for the economic
reforms and thus it seemed extremely attractive from the point of view
of the governing politicians. However, pressure from the export lobby
prevented the Central Bank from changing the targets in 1997. A signifi-
cant increase in international reserves of US$ 9 billion did not allow the
Ruble to appreciate further in the first half of 1997.
However, the bulky reserves made the Central Bank think about altering
the exchange rate policy. In November 1997, it was announced that, in
1998, the Central Bank would switch to a more flexible exchange rate
policy. The Central Bank refused to guarantee any particular level of ex-
change rate and decided to allow the rate to fluctuate during
1998 – 2000 almost freely within the new, wide corridor (from 5.25 to
7.15 Rubles per US$). The average exchange rate target for 1998 was
set at 6.1 Rubles per US$. In addition, the Central Bank aimed at real
exchange rate stability in 1998, as it had done before.
We believe that the choice of exchange rate policy for 1998 – 2000 was
made by the Central Bank long before the appearance of the first signs
of crisis in the Russian financial markets. We guess that the aim of wid-
ening the corridor was to stop the increase in reserves and to allow the
exchange rate in future to reach the lower, not the upper, boundary of
the corridor. The lower boundary, as well as the target exchange rate
for 1998, was set at a very low level (let us recall that, at the end of
1997, the official exchange rate was equal to 6.0 Rubles per US$). The
IMF approved the measure and, later, much effort was put in to avoid
devaluation.
The reaction of market participants to the announcement of the new
policy was a surprise to Central Bank officials. The general opinion was
that, soon after January 1 1998, the exchange rate would reach the up-
per boundary of the corridor. And, in fact, the expectations of devalua-
tion were completely reasonable.
It looked very unlikely that the sharp decrease in world commodity
prices, which started at the end of 1997, could be compensated for by
new capital inflows to Russia. In order to compensate for the decrease
in export earnings without a real depreciation, foreign capital inflows in
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1998 had to surpass their 1997 level. In the situation of world financial
crisis, which significantly changed the attitude of private investors to
emerging markets, a sharp decrease in such inflows looked much more
probable.
On the other hand, there were no clear signs of a decrease in resident
capital outflows or even factors that could diminish capital flight. In
1997, the net outflows of Russian capital from the private sector (with-
out taking into account cash currency purchases) stabilised at the level
they had been in 1996, i.e. US$ 31 billion. The Central Bank and the
Government did not pay sufficient attention to this problem. It was as-
sumed that restricting capital flight by setting better state controls would
not be consistent with the liberal economic policy being implemented.
By the end of 1997, international reserves had fallen to US$ 17.8 billion
from the maximum of US$ 24.5 billion they had been in the middle of
the year. On the other hand, at the end of 1997 the face value of
GKO/OFZ bonds officially held by non-residents was close to US$ 18
billion. At that time, the short-term foreign liabilities of the banking sys-
tem, which were mostly hidden foreign investment in the GKO/OFZ mar-
ket, amounted to US$ 16.5 billion.
Theoretically, it was possible that foreign capital inflows would decrease
a little, although IMF loans and a decrease in reserves would cover the
shortfall. But the situation was clearly very unstable and the probability
of a significant weakening of the Ruble was very high.
The Russian Government tried to stabilise the situation by attracting
massive foreign financing and allowing interest rates to rise when the
situation worsened. The idea was to prevent foreign capital from being
withdrawn from the GKO/OFZ market, since withdrawal would immedi-
ately lead to both fiscal and monetary catastrophe. Let us recall that, in
the middle of 1997, the share of non-residents in the GKO/OFZ market
("S"-accounts only) reached 30% and it remained approximately at this
level throughout the rest of 1997 and 1998. We have already mentioned
that the stock of foreign investment in the GKO/OFZ market was enor-
mous when compared to the level of official international reserves.
The Government supposed that foreign borrowings, which increase for-
eign reserves, would help to kill the expectations of devaluation and
stop foreign capital outflows from the GKO/OFZ market. In this way, the
Government hoped to avoid domestic currency devaluation. It was ex-
pected that lower devaluation expectations and a lower level of domestic
borrowing could decrease interest rates and help to avoid fiscal catas-
trophe.
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Following this logic, the Government announced a policy for the substi-
tution of domestic short-term borrowings, which were extremely expen-
sive, by longer-term and "cheap" foreign borrowings. In the first half of
1998, the Government placed four new issues of eurobonds, which
totalled US$ 4.8 billion. Additionally, the Federal Government received
US$ 2.9 billion in loans and credits from international financial organisa-
tions and foreign governments. The exchange of a part of GKO/OFZ
bonds to eurobonds in July 1998 was the climax of the policy.
As a result of the deal, the Government changed a part of short-term
domestic debt amounting to US$ 4.4 billion (if converted at the official
exchange rate at the moment of the deal), including interest, for a long-
term foreign currency debt amounting to US$ 6.0 billion (not including
coupon payments). The coupon was set at 8.75% yearly for eurobonds
with a maturity of 7 years and 11% yearly for eurobonds with a maturity
of 20 years. Thus, the Government borrowed US$ 6.0 billion on the
world capital markets at 15% yearly in order to sell foreign currency in
Russia at an exchange rate which was much lower than the potential
one. Even taking into account the fact that the eurobonds placed in July
were medium and long-term, it is difficult to call the deal beneficial for
the Russian Government.
The substitution policy clearly did not achieve its targets. The massive
loans from the international capital markets increased more and more
the foreign liabilities of the Russian Government. This increase in foreign
liabilities strengthened expectations of the bankruptcy of the Govern-
ment in the case of devaluation. This led to a fall in the attractiveness of
GKO/OFZ bonds, even if devaluation expectations remained stable. The
probability of defaulting on domestic debt was clearly much higher than
it was on eurobonds simply because it was the Russian, and not the in-
ternational, legislation which regulated GKO/OFZ issuance.
From the beginning of the crisis in November 1997, any period of tem-
porary stabilisation was immutably succeeded by a sharp aggravation of
the situation in the GKO/OFZ and foreign exchange markets. Average
interest rates in the secondary GKO/OFZ market in November 1997 –
– May 1998 constituted 32% yearly. However, during the aggravation of
the crisis at the end of January 1998, the average interest rate reached
an annualised rate of 46%. At the end of May 1998, in response to the
new wave of the crisis, the Central Bank raised the refinancing rate up
to 150%. The average interest rate in the GKO/OFZ market at that time
reached 78% yearly. The rise in the interest rate in the GKO/OFZ market
to 120% at the beginning of July 1998 was the cause of the halting of
placements of new GKO/OFZ bonds and the offer to exchange part of
GKO/OFZ issues for eurobonds.
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Despite aggressive federal eurobond placing and very high interest
rates, in the first half of 1998 international reserves decreased by US$
1.5 billion and, on July 1 1998, constituted US$ 16.2 billion. The attrac-
tion of foreign finance, which was intended to stop capital outflows from
the GKO/OFZ market, to kill expectations of devaluation and, thus, to
prevent devaluation itself, did not, in the best case, improve the situa-
tion.
The halting of placements of new GKO/OFZ bonds from July 1998, ex-
changing a part of short-term GKO/OFZ bonds for long-term eurobonds
in the same month and reaching agreement with the IMF about a signifi-
cant stabilisation credit, the first tranche of which (US$ 4.8 billion) was
also disbursed in that month, became the last, unsuccessful, attempts
of the Federal Government and the Central Bank to avoid the financial
crisis.
In the first half of August, interest rates in the GKO/OFZ market, which
decreased just after the IMF credit disbursement, renewed their growth.
By August 13 – 14 1998, interest rates became higher than 160%
yearly. The liquidity of the market almost reached zero.
The fact that the crisis was not even delayed by the agreement with the
IMF about the huge disbursements probably means that investors did
not believe that something could prevent devaluation. On the other
hand, the moment after the agreement had been reached was the best
time for selling GKO/OFZ bonds.
In announcing that it was defaulting on domestic debt, the Government
probably hoped to avoid huge devaluation, since capital could not be
withdrawn from the GKO/OFZ market. But it did not help and, in a few
months, the Ruble became weaker in real terms by a factor of two.
External debt service became unbearable for the budget, despite the
default on domestic debt.
In this paper, we restrict our consideration to the time period from 1992
to 1997. The aim of this project is to study the negative and positive
consequences for Russian GDP of the real appreciation in those years.
The consequences of the sharp real depreciation occurring in 1998 re-
main beyond the scope of the paper.
As a result of the real appreciation, imported goods become cheaper
with respect to domestic ones, and, hence, more affordable. This is es-
pecially important in the case of high-tech equipment, which is a key
factor in the renewal of economic growth in Russia. Moreover, due to
the income effect, demand for domestic consumption and investment
goods may fall very weakly or even increase. Furthermore, because of
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decreases in the prices of imported inputs, the costs for domestic pro-
ducers fell, which could increase domestic supply.
The strengthening of the Ruble diminishes the attractiveness of a for-
eign currency as a financial instrument, which could lead to the de-dol-
larisation of the economy, an increase in Ruble credit resources and
growth in the official foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the for-
eign debt service burden decreases.
Among the negative consequences of the real appreciation, one could
mention the loss of competitiveness of Russian goods, which could in-
fluence Russian exports negatively and shift domestic demand from
Russian to imported goods. Furthermore, real appreciation leads to an
erosion in the real value of the dollar savings of the population.
Thus, it is not clear a priori if the cumulative effect of the real apprecia-
tion on the economy, on the whole or on output in particular, is positive
or negative since some economic agents gain and others lose.
The literature on the point contains vast discussions of the possible
contractional effects of devaluation. Hirschman (1949), Diaz-Alejandro
(1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978) discussed the impact of de-
valuation on demand. An increase in total import costs and a cut in real
wages due to increases in internal prices (through increases in interme-
diate import costs) have been considered. Later papers by Buffie (1986)
and van Wijnberger (1986) have taken the supply side into account.
These papers mention, among the contractional effects of devaluation,
an increase in intermediate import prices (Buffie), and an increase in
imported consumer goods prices and a reduction in real foreign credit
volume (van Wijnberger).
Buffie (1984) created a model in which devaluation could have an ex-
pansionary effect through a decrease in the market interest rate, if the
share of dollar-denominated bonds in financial wealth remained high
enough.
The contractionary effect of devaluation could be exaggerated by static
models which do not take into account the lagged response of exports.
Solimano (1986) took some steps to resolve the problem, finding sev-
eral quarters of initial contraction in Chile.
Thus, the available literature on the subject gives some grounds to sus-
pect that the short-run effect of devaluation on output is negative.
Among recent literature, there exist numerous papers on a related sub-
ject: the connection between inflation and growth. Barro (1995) con-
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sidered inflation as one of the determinants of the long-run supply curve
and Karras (1993) estimated an AD–AS model with inflation as the en-
dogenous variable. An attempt to find a relationship between inflation
and short-run growth in Russia was carried out by Granville, Dynnikova
and Larichev (1996).
The further structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 contains the
description of the data which we use in our research. Section 2 dis-
cusses in more detail the effects of the real appreciation on foreign
trade. Section 3 studies the effects of the real appreciation on con-
sumption. Section 4 describes the model we use for the estimation of
the cumulative effects of the real exchange rate on output. Section 5
contains the results of the model estimation. And, finally, Section 6 gives
some conclusions.
1. THE DATA
We use monthly observations for 1992 – 1997. The data on real GDP
are available only from the beginning of 1993.
Descriptions of the data used in the estimation of the model (Section 4):
Variable Indicator Source
Y Real GDP Real GDP – MoF Economic Expert Group
calculations on the base of GKS data
P CPI Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye ekonomichekie
pokazateli
M M2 MoF Economic Expert Group
E Average monthly
$ exchange rate
at MICEX
CBR, Bjulleten bankovskoj statistiki
P* US CPI 3% inflation per year
Pfuel PPI for fuel Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye ekonomichekie
pokazateli
Penergy PPI for electricity Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye ekonomichekie
pokazateli
πe The second lag of
inflation
Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye ekonomicheskie
pokazateli
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The table contains information on the data used for our analysis of the
real exchange rate impact on foreign trade (Section 2):
Variable Indicator used Source
Real exchange
rate
Nominal exchange rate,
multiplied by US CPI and
divided by Russian CPI
Russian CPI – Goskomstat,
Kratkosrochnye eko-
nomicheskie pokazateli,
RECEP, Monetary and Financial
Report;
For a description of the nomi-
nal exchange rate and US CPI
data, see the previous table.
Non-CIS imports
of white sugar
and meat
Volumes, measured in
dollars;
Volumes, measured in
tons;
Price, equal to dollar vol-
ume, divided by the num-
ber of tons exported
Goskomstat, Department of
National Accounts
Exports of crude
oil and natural
gas to non-CIS
countries and to
CIS countries
Volumes, measured in
dollars;
Volumes, measured in
tons (m3);
Price, equal to dollar vol-
ume, divided by the num-
ber of tons exported
Goskomstat, Department of
National Accounts
Non-CIS exports,
taxes on crude oil
and natural gas
ECU per ton;
Real Ruble value of tax
per ton
Economic Expert Group of the
Ministry of Finance
Excise taxes on
natural gas and
crude oil
Rubles per ton;
% of producer price
Economic Expert Group of the
Ministry of Finance
Domestic price of
crude oil and
natural gas
Producer price;
Producer price plus do-
mestic transportation
costs
Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye
ekonomicheskie pokazateli
Economic Expert Group of the
Ministry of Finance
Domestic price of
meat
Producer price Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnye
ekonomicheskie pokazateli
Economic Expert Group of the
Ministry of Finance
Meat and white
sugar import tar-
iffs
% of customs value Economic Expert Group of the
Ministry of Finance
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2. IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Since we are studying the connection between the real exchange rate
and real GDP, let us consider the real value of exports and imports,
measured in the domestic currency. The real value is equal to the
physical volume V multiplied by the unit price measured in dollars p$
and the nominal exchange rate, divided by the domestic price level, E/P:
,/
$
PEpVEX EXEX ××= (2.1)
./
$
PEpVIM IMIM ××= (2.2)
The physical volumes of exports (imports), in general, depend on the
real price of the exported (imported) good, measured in the domestic
currency
P
Ep ×$ .
So, any change in this ratio influences the real value of exports (im-
ports), measured in the domestic currency, through two channels: the
revaluation of the physical volumes; and the impact this has on the vol-
umes traded. For exports, the direction of both effects is the same: a
rise in the real price of the exported good boosts both the number of
units exported and the real value of every unit. For imports the cumula-
tive effect is ambiguous: a rise in the real price of the imported good
lowers domestic demand for the import of the good but increases the
real value of every unit imported.
Unfortunately, Goskomstat and the Customs Committee do not publish a
monthly series on cumulative export and import price indices. In this
section, we study foreign trade in particular goods for which we have
managed to obtain data on physical volumes and prices.
2.1. Exports
We studied the influence of the real export price, measured in the do-
mestic currency, on the physical volumes of exports of crude oil and
natural gas, which are the most important Russian export products.
Each of these two commodities attained approximately one-fifth of the
total value of exports in recent years.
We assumed that the physical volume of exports V (to non-CIS or to CIS
countries) would depend on the real prices at which the product was
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exported to non-CIS countries and to CIS countries,
P
EPnon-CIS × $  and 
P
EPCIS × $ ,
and the real domestic price. Our assumption reflects three possibilities
for the producer: to export to non-CIS countries; to export to CIS coun-
tries; or to sell in the domestic market. Also, we considered the possi-
bility of supply constraints and we introduced the domestic extraction of
the product into our considerations.
We adjusted the prices for different taxation regimes. In the case of ex-
ports to non-CIS countries, we did this by subtracting the export duty1
and the excise tax from the contract price of the exported product. In
the case of exports to CIS countries, we deducted the excise tax and
VAT from the contract price of the product. As regards the real domes-
tic price, we considered the domestic producer price, which does not
include excise tax or VAT.
In the case of perfect markets, all three considered prices must be
equal (after adjustment for transportation costs). There are some rea-
sons why this is not the case in Russia. These include non-tariff export
regulations (quotas, institute of special exporters), long-term fixed price
export contracts, the limited capacity of pipelines and non-payments in
Russia and in the CIS.
Thus, in the case of crude oil and natural gas we decided to study the
relationships between the physical volume of exports, the price at which
the product is sold abroad and domestically (excluding taxes), and ex-
traction, using a reasonable number of lags.
We used pairwise Granger tests to check the direction of causality, to
choose the proper functional form for our regressions and to avoid any
interpretation of correlation through the third variable as a causal rela-
tionship. We implemented Granger tests with a number of lags from 2 to
6, using all available observations. In general, we rejected or assumed
the hypothesis of causality if the result was stable over a lag structure
starting from a sufficiently high number of lags.
Since most of the series used in the research looked to have trends we
implemented stationarity tests. We used augmented Dickey–Fuller tests
                                               
1 All export taxes (except for crude oil) were removed from April 1 1996. The ex-
port tax for crude oil was removed on July 1 1996. Export taxes were reintro-
duced in 1999.
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with different numbers of lags and all available observations. In small
samples, unit root tests tend to lose power the larger the number of
lags that are included. That is why we rejected the hypothesis of the unit
root if we were able to do it at the 1% level of significance on the basis
of an ADF test with a small number of lags but without signs of auto-
correlations in the residuals.
We checked for the possibility of co-integration between non-stationary
variables using numerous augmented Engle–Granger tests and Johan-
sen co-integration tests but we were not able to find any reasonably
strong evidence of co-integration. Results of different tests were ex-
tremely controversial and inconsistent. And it is not surprising. In the
small samples which we have (4–6 years of observations), asymptotical
co-integration test results cannot be reliable. As mentioned in Davidson
and MacKinnon (1993), in estimating regressions at such levels we risk
either finding a purely spurious relationship or making wrong inferences
about the estimated coefficients of the co-integrating vectors due both
to non-standard asymptotic properties of the parameters and to small
sample bias. So, we strongly preferred the estimation of stationary dif-
ferences despite the difficulties with the interpretation of the results.
2.1.1. Crude oil. In the case of crude oil we excluded the real domes-
tic price from the consideration for the reasons explained below.
Fig. 1 shows the dynamics of the price of exported crude oil (net of
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Figure 1. Crude oil domestic and export prices.
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taxes, but transportation included2) and the domestic price converted
into dollars (net of both taxes and transportation costs). Though not
regulated by the Government, the domestic producer price for crude oil
has been almost constant in dollar terms since the middle of 1995. It
could be explained by the fact that oil refineries, closely affiliated to oil
extracting companies, purchase the majority of crude oil sold domesti-
cally. Thus, the movement of oil within a group of related companies
and changes in its price does not matter for the group. So, the price
level could be chosen almost arbitrarily. In all probability, the managers
of Russian oil companies have agreed some constant common level for
the producer price of crude oil just for convenience. Given this, the
uselessness of domestic oil prices in explaining the behaviour of export
volumes is clear.
It can be seen from the fig. 1 that the prices at which crude oil is ex-
ported to non-CIS and CIS countries (excluding taxes) are not strongly
correlated. Appendix I contains the table of mutual correlations for cur-
rent values and lagged changes in the logarithms of seasonally adjusted
prices of exported crude oil.
The implemented ADF tests did not allow us to reject the hypothesis of
unit root in the levels of export volumes (both to CIS and to non-CIS
countries) and the prices of exported crude oil. At the same time, the
first differences for all the variables turned out to be stationary. Thus,
we assumed crude oil export volumes and the prices of exported crude
oil as I(1). As for the domestic extraction of crude oil, the ADF tests al-
low us to reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity. So, we considered
the extraction variable as I(0). The results of the ADF tests are given in
Appendix III.
The next step was to check which considered variables (if any) Granger-
cause the month-to-month changes3 in seasonally-adjusted export vol-
umes. The results of the tests are given in Appendix VI. Tests showed
that the change in the real price of crude oil exported to non-CIS coun-
tries





 ×
P
EP
D
non-CIS 
$
                                               
2  We were not able to extract transportation costs due to the lack of data. Ac-
cording to LUKoil experts, they were equal to approximately $10 per ton in 1994
and $20 in 1996 and 1997.
3  Here and elsewhere the lower "change of Y" or the "short-term adjustment
of Y" refer to the "month-to-month change in the logarithm of (seasonally-adjus-
ted) Y".
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Granger-causes the change in the volumes of exports both to CIS and
to non-CIS countries (with no causality in the opposite direction). We
found no causality between





 ×
P
EP
D
CIS 
$
and changes in the volumes of exports both to CIS and to non-CIS
countries. Also, the Granger tests did not detect any causality between
changes in the prices of the crude oil exported to non-CIS and to CIS
countries.
As for domestic extraction, the tests detected causality leading from
changes in export volumes to extraction (and to the change in extrac-
tion), but not in the opposite direction. We could suggest the following
explanation for the demonstrated direction of the dependence. On the
one hand, short-term adjustments in export volumes are small enough
and thus are not constrained by the level of supply. On the other hand,
additional external demand could lead to short-run increases in export
volumes at the current level of extraction with a further adjustment in
production, partly as a result of additional export earnings which give
additional liquidity for investment and production.
Thus, the Granger tests suggest that we estimate the influence of the
change in the real price of crude oil exported to non-CIS countries on
the change in the export volumes of crude oil (both to non-CIS and to
CIS countries).
Assuming a loglinear form of dependence, and restricting our attention
to the first three lags of the explanatory variable, we obtained the fol-
lowing equation to estimate:
∑
=
−






−
×
+=
3
0
$ )(ln)(ln
i
CISnon
i iP
Ep
DbaVD , (2.3)
for non-CIS countries: 0
3
0
>∑
=i
ib , ∑
=
3
0i
ib  is the steady state4 elasticity of
)(VD with respect to 





 ×
P
EP
D
CIS
$ . While we expected ∑
=
3
0i
ib  to be
                                               
4  In a steady state the real price of crude oil exports to non-CIS countries does
not change with time.
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clearly positive in the case of non-CIS countries, the impact of the
changes in the real price of crude oil exported to non-CIS countries on
changes in the physical volumes of exports to CIS countries a priori is
unclear. On the one hand, a higher increase in the price of crude oil ex-
ported to non-CIS countries means a larger increase in the attractive-
ness of exports to non-CIS countries when compared to exports to the
CIS. On the other hand, the greater the increase in the price of crude oil
exported to non-CIS countries, the greater is the improvement in the
bargaining power of Russia in trade with CIS countries.
In the case of perfect markets, the improvement would immediately lead
to an increase in the price of crude oil exported to CIS countries. How-
ever, on the basis of Granger tests we concluded that the increase in
the price of crude oil exported to non-CIS countries did not actually
cause the increase in the price of crude oil exported to CIS countries.
The improvement in bargaining power may not imply an increase in
prices to the CIS, but instead the improvement of other (formal or in-
formal) terms and conditions of the contracts (time and timeliness of
payment, clearing of arrears, type of currency, conditions of barter and
so on). Thus, increases in the price of crude oil exported to non-CIS
countries could well result in larger, as well as in smaller, increases in
the volumes of crude oil exported to CIS countries.
The results of the estimation of (2.3) are in Table 1. The sample of re-
gression starts in March 1995, when quotas and the institute of special
exports were removed. We used the first lag of the dependent variable
in the regression for non-CIS countries in order to account for autocor-
relations in the residuals.
For the "short" regression for crude oil exports to CIS countries (the last
column of the table), we tested the hypothesis that
0
3
0
<∑
=i
ib .
On the basis of the F-test, we were not able to reject the hypothesis
that the sum is equal to zero, even at the 15% level of significance.
Thus, we have evidence that short-run changes in the real price of
crude oil exported to non-CIS countries implies changes in the physical
volumes of crude oil exports to non-CIS countries. At the same time,
changes in the physical volumes of crude oil exported to CIS countries
do not appear to be sensitive to constant changes in the real price of
crude oil exported to non-CIS countries, as well as to any changes in
the real price of the crude oil exported to the CIS countries themselves.
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Table 1.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in the physical volume of crude
oil exported.
Sample: March 95 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables were taken in logarithms and were seasonally adjusted before differ-
entiation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Non-CIS exports of crude
oil
CIS exports of crude oil
Variable
All lags Only significant
 lags
All lags Only significant
 lags
Constant term   0.01
 (0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
 0.00
(0.04)
 0.00
(0.05)
The month-to-month
change in the real price
of crude oil exported to
non-CIS countries:
Current –0.03
 (0.09)
 0.58***
(0.37)
  0.68**
 (0.36)
First lag –0.07
 (0.09)
–0.92*
 (0.38)
–1.02*
 (0.36)
Second lag –0.03
 (0.08)
  0.21
 (0.37)
Third lag   0.21*
 (0.09)
 0.20*
(0.08)
–0.39
 (0.39)
First lag of the
dependent variable
–0.57*
 (0.13)
–0.56*
(0.12)
R-squared   0.50 0.48   0.31   0.28
Q-statistic
(16 lags)****
  9.10
 (0.91)
9.13
(0.90)
15.70
 (0.47)
  9.79
 (0.87)
∑
=
3
0i
ib  0.08         0.20 –0.51       –0.34
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — Significant at the 10% level of significance.
*** — Significant at the 15% level of significance.
**** — P-value in parentheses.
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2.1.2. Natural gas. In the case of crude oil exports, we used prices
including transportation costs because of the lack of data but, in the
case of natural gas, the use of such prices is fully justified. The reason
for this is that the same company, RAO "Gazprom", is responsible both
for the extraction and the transportation of natural gas. Fig. 2 shows the
dynamics of the prices at which natural gas is exported to non-CIS and
to CIS countries, and the domestic price measured in dollars. Here, all
the prices are adjusted to the different taxation regimes and include
transportation costs.
As in the case of crude oil, the prices do not look strongly correlated.
Appendix II contains a table of the mutual correlations between the
current and lagged values of the logarithmic changes in the seasonally-
adjusted prices at which natural gas is exported to non-CIS countries, to
CIS countries, or at which is sold domestically.
On the basis of the ADF tests, we concluded that, in the case of the
natural gas prices at which the product is exported to non-CIS countries
and to CIS countries, the physical volume of exports to non-CIS coun-
tries and the domestic extraction of natural gas are I(1) variables. At the
same time, the volume of exports to CIS countries turned out to be sta-
tionary, while the real domestic price was the I(2) variable. The results
of the ADF tests are given in Appendix III.
On the basis of the Granger causality tests, we concluded that short-run
changes in natural gas domestic extraction Granger-cause a change in
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Figure 2. Natural gas domestic and export prices.
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the physical volumes of natural gas exports to non-CIS countries (with
no causality in the opposite direction). The change in the real price of
natural gas exported to non-CIS countries and the second change in the
real domestic price Granger-cause each other. We did not find any
other causal relationships between the changes in domestic extraction,
the export volumes and the prices at which natural gas is exported, and
the second change in the real domestic price. The results of the tests
are given in Appendix VII.
Thus, the Granger causality tests suggested only one relationship to es-
timate: that between the month-to-month change in the seasonally-
adjusted domestic extraction of natural gas and the month-to-month
change in the seasonally-adjusted physical volumes of natural gas ex-
ports to non-CIS countries. The results of the estimation are given in
Table 2.
According to our estimates, larger increase in the domestic extraction of
natural gas implies smaller increase in the physical volumes of exports
to non-CIS countries. Possibly, "Gazprom" considers an extra increase
in exports as a way of compensating for the loss of revenues caused by
the smaller increase in production.
Thus, the change in the physical volume of natural gas exported to both
CIS and non-CIS countries are insensitive to changes in the real prices
of exported natural gas.
According to our results, the decrease in E/P (the real appreciation) in-
fluences the month-to-month changes in the real Ruble equivalent of
natural gas export earnings (for both CIS and non-CIS countries) only
through the revaluation effect. The same statement is true for crude oil
exports to CIS countries. In the case of crude oil exports to non-CIS
countries, in addition to a negative revaluation effect, a larger month-to-
month real appreciation implies a smaller month-to-month increase in
the physical volume of exports.
2.2. Imports
Raw and processed foodstuffs and agricultural products accounted for
25–30% of the imports registered by customs in recent years. We
studied the influence of the real price of imported meat and white sugar,
measured in the domestic currency, on the physical volume of the
products imported.
We assume that the physical volume of imports V (from non-CIS coun-
tries or CIS countries) could depend on the real prices at which
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Table 2.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in the physical volume of
natural gas exported.
Sample: August 93 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All the variables were taken in logarithms and seasonally adjusted before differ-
entiation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Non-CIS exports of natural gas
Variable
All lags Only significant lags
Constant term   0.00
 (0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
The month-to-month change
in the domestic extraction of
natural gas:
Current   0.43
 (0.37)
First lag   0.46
 (0.36)
Second lag –0.43
(0.36)
Third lag –1.03*
 (0.36)
–0.87*
(0.33)
Fourth lag –0.03
 (0.40)
Fifth lag   0.14
 (0.41)
Sixth lag   0.44
 (0.40)
R-squared   0.22   0.12
Q-statistic
(24 lags)**
 28.49
 (0.24)
24.39
  (0.44)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — P-value in parenthesis.
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a product is imported from non-CIS countries and from CIS countries
P
EPnon-CIS × $  and 
P
EPCIS × $ ,
and the real domestic price of the product. Also, we considered the
possibility of domestic supply constraints and introduced domestic pro-
duction into our consideration. Finally, we assumed that real GDP could
influence the physical volumes of imports through income.
We adjusted prices to the different regimes of taxation, that is, we
added VAT and import tariffs to the price at which products were im-
ported from non-CIS countries, while we added VAT to the domestic
producer price and VAT to the price of white sugar imported from the
CIS (for September 1996 – February 1998, when imports from the
Ukraine were taxed).
Thus, in the cases of meat and white sugar, we decided to study the
connection between the physical volume of imports, the prices at which
a product is imported, the domestic price (applicable taxes added), do-
mestic production of the product and real GDP, including a reasonable
number of lags.
As in the case of exports, we used pairwise Granger tests to check the
direction of causality, as well as choosing the proper functional form for
our regressions and avoiding the interpretation of correlation through a
third variable as a causal relationship. We also used augmented Dickey–
Fuller tests with a different number of lags and all available observations
to check the series for the degree of integration. We checked for the
possibility of co-integration between import volumes and the other con-
sidered variables, but were not able to reject the absence of co-
integration.
2.2.1. Meat. The implemented ADF tests did not allow us to reject the
hypothesis of unit root in the levels of import volumes (both from CIS
and non-CIS countries) and the prices of meat imports from CIS and
non-CIS countries, as well as in the level of the domestic production of
meat. At the same time, all the differences turned out to be stationary.
Thus, we can assume that the domestic production of meat, the import
volumes and the prices at which meat was imported are I(1). As for real
GDP, the ADF tests led us to reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity.
So, we considered real GDP to be the I(0) variable. The results of the
ADF tests are given in Appendix IV.
The next step was to check which considered variables (if any) Granger-
cause the month-to-month changes in the volumes of imports. The re-
sults of the tests are given in Appendix VIII.
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The tests showed that changes in the volume of meat imported from
non-CIS countries Granger-cause the change in domestic meat produc-
tion and the change in the real price of meat imported from non-CIS
countries (with no causality in the opposite direction). The change in the
physical volume of meat imported from CIS countries Granger-causes
the change in the real price of meat imported from CIS countries (also
with no causality in the opposite direction).
We found a mutual causality between month-to-month changes in real
GDP (seasonally-adjusted) and changes in the volume of meat imports
from non-CIS countries.
At the same time, the month-to-month change in the real price of meat
imported from CIS countries





 ×
P
EP
D
CIS
$
does not Granger-cause the change in the non-CIS import volumes.
Changes in real GDP and in domestic production do not Granger-cause
the change in CIS import volumes. Also, Granger tests did not detect
any causality between the changes in the prices of meat imported from
non-CIS or from CIS countries.
Thus, the Granger tests suggest that the volume of meat imports turned
out to be primary to both the prices of the meat imported and domestic
meat production. So, we decided to estimate numerically the influence
on domestic meat production of month-to-month increases in the vol-
ume of meat imported from non-CIS countries.
Assuming the loglinear form of the dependence, and restricting our at-
tention to the first six lags of the explanatory variable, we obtained the
following equation to estimate:
))(ln()productionDomesticln(
6
0
iVbaD
i
i −+= ∑
=
, (2.4)
∑
=
6
0i
ib  is the steady state5 elasticity of )productionDomesticln(D  with
respect to )ln(VD . The expected ∑
=
6
0i
ib  is negative, since an additional
increase in import volumes takes away an additional share of the do-
mestic market.
The results of the estimation of  (2.4)  are in Table 3.  The sample of the
                                               
5  In a steady state, the physical volume of meat imported from non-CIS coun-
tries does not change with time.
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Table 3.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in domestic meat production.
Sample: August 93 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables were taken in logarithms before differentiation. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
Non-CIS imports of meat
Variable
All lags Only significant lags
Constant term   0.00
 (0.03)
  0.01
 (0.03)
Month-to-month change in the volume of
meat imported from non-CIS countries:
Current –0.11
 (0.10)
First lag –0.19*
 (0.09)
–0.18*
 (0.09)
Second lag –0.20*
 (0.09)
–0.20*
 (0.09)
Third lag   0.04
 (0.09)
Fourth lag   0.04
 (0.09)
Fifth lag –0.05
 (0.09)
Sixth lag –0.03
 (0.10)
First lag of the dependent variable –0.59*
 (0.15)
–0.59*
 (0.13)
Second lag of the dependent variable –0.31*
 (0.15)
–0.34*
 (0.13)
Sixth lag of  the dependent variable   0.20
 (0.14)
  0.16
 (0.13)
R-squared   0.39   0.37
Q-statistic
(16 lags)**
 16.48
 (0.42)
 19.19
 (0.26)
∑
=
6
0i
ib –0.50 –0.38
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — P-value in parenthesis.
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regression is determined by the availability of data on domestic meat
production. We used lags in the dependent variable to account for the
autocorrelations in the residuals.
For the "short" regression (the last column of the table), we tested the
hypothesis that
0
6
0
<∑
=i
ib .
On the basis of the F-test, we rejected the hypothesis that the sum is
equal to zero, at the 5% level of significance.
Thus, we have the evidence that larger short-run changes in the volume
of meat imported from non-CIS countries implies a smaller change in
domestic meat production.
Changes in the physical volume of imported meat do not look sensitive
to changes in the real prices of imported meat. So, we conclude that
short-run import adjustments were not caused by changes in the real
exchange rate.
Thus, the additional increase in the amount of meat imported was not
determined by an additional increase in the demand for imported meat,
arising either from any additional increase in the competitiveness of im-
ported goods or from an additional fall in the domestic supply of meat.
Instead, the additional increase in non-CIS meat supply crowded out
some part of the increase in domestic production.
2.2.2. White sugar. Here, we do not take into consideration the do-
mestic price due to the lack of data.
On the basis of the ADF tests, we concluded that the prices of white
sugar imported from non-CIS countries and from CIS countries, and the
physical volume of white sugar imported from non-CIS countries, are
I(1) variables. At the same time, the volume of white sugar imported
from CIS countries and the domestic production of granulated sugar
turned out to be stationary. The results of the ADF tests are given in
Appendix IV.
On the basis of the Granger causality tests, we concluded that short-run
changes in seasonally-adjusted real GDP Granger-cause a change in
the physical volume of the total amount of white sugar imported (with no
causality in the opposite direction). We did not find any causal relation-
ships between import volumes and the price at which white sugar is im-
ported, or the import volumes and the domestic production of white
sugar. The results of the tests are given in Appendix IX.
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Thus, the Granger causality tests suggested one relationship to esti-
mate: between the month-to-month change in seasonally-adjusted real
GDP and the month-to-month change in the physical volume of white
sugar imports.
Assuming the loglinear form of the dependence, and restricting our at-
tention to the first three lags of the explanatory variable, we obtained
the following equation to estimate:
( ))(ln)ln(
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The results of the estimation are given in Table 4. The sample of the re-
gression is determined by the availability of data on white sugar imports
from CIS countries. We used the second lag of the dependent variable
to account for the autocorrelations in the residuals.
According to our estimates, short-run changes in real GDP imply a sig-
nificant change in the physical volume of white sugar imports. At the
same time, changes in the physical volume of white sugar imports do
not appear to be sensitive to changes in the real prices at which white
sugar is imported.
Thus, we found the real appreciation had no effect on the physical vol-
umes of meat and white sugar imported. The real appreciation influ-
enced the month-to-month change in the real Ruble value of meat and
white sugar imports only through the revaluation effect, which de-
creased import expenditure.
3. THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND CONSUMPTION
The real exchange rate could influence consumption through real in-
comes. Worse terms of trade decrease real income at any given level of
income measured in terms of exportables, through making imports rela-
tively more expensive than exports. As a result, savings decrease and
the current account will deteriorate (where incomes, measured in terms
of exportables, are held constant) — the so-called Harberger–Laursen–
Metzler effect. Along with many papers offering models supporting the
effect, some authors, for example Obstfeld (1982), argue that a wors-
ening of the terms of trade could lead to an increase in savings and
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an improvement in the current account. The paper of Svensson and
Razin (1983) is consistent with both the Harberger–Laursen–Metzler
effect and Obstfeld’s findings. It divides the effect on real expenditure of
a worsening in the terms of trade into two parts: the wealth effect on
real expenditure and the inter-temporal substitution effect, incorporating
both static and inter-temporal effects. The inter-temporal effect occurs
due to changes in the real interest rate. As long as the wealth effect of
the real depreciation is negative, the substitution effect is ambiguous.
Table 4.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in the physical volumes of total
white sugar imports.
Sample: April 95 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables were taken in logarithms before differentiation. Real GDP is season-
ally adjusted. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Total imports of white sugar
Variable
All lags Only significant lags
Constant term   0.01
 (0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
The month-to-month change in
real GDP:
Current   2.45
 (4.63)
First lag   9.04**
 (4.67)
8.23**
(4.14)
Second lag   1.01
 (4.90)
Third lag  11.79*
 (4.78)
11.70*
(4.41)
Second lag of the dependent
variable
–0.32**
 (0.18)
–0.34*
(0.16)
R-squared   0.31 0.30
Q-statistic
(8 lags)***
  9.03
 (0.34)
7.83
(0.45)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — Significant at the 10% level of significance.
*** — P-value in parenthesis.
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Table 5.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in the real per capita con-
sumption of the population.
Sample: February 94 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables were taken in logarithms and seasonally-adjusted before differentia-
tion. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variable Coefficient
Constant term 0.00
(0.01)
The month-to-month change in real wages:
Current   0.54*
 (0.20)
First lag –0.22
 (0.21)
Second lag   0.12
 (0.20)
Third lag –0.11
 (0.18)
The month-to-month change in the real stock of household
deposits
  0.10
 (0.14)
The month-to-month change in the real exchange rate:
Current   0.14
 (0.11)
First lag –0.06
 (0.11)
Second lag   0.22**
 (0.12)
Third lag –0.23*
 (0.11)
R-squared   0.33
Q-statistic
(20 lags)***
11.93
 (0.92)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — Significant at the 10% level of significance.
*** — P-value in parentheses.
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In this part, we study the effects of the real exchange rate (E/P) on the
real per capita consumption of the population, keeping constant both
real disposable income and real wealth, proxied by real wages and the
real stock of household bank deposits. Again, we avoid working with
non-stationary series by differentiating them. We restrict our attention to
the first three lags of the explanatory variables. We do not consider the
lagged values of the real stock of household deposits since changes in
the stock are closely correlated with savings. The results of the estima-
tion are contained in Table 5.
Considering only the statistically significant variables, and replacing the
second and the third lags of differentiation in the real exchange rate by
the second lag of the second differentiation, we came to the following
regression (Table 6):
According to our results, an increase in the rate of real appreciation de-
creases the rate of increase in real consumption two months later. This
could be referred to by the decrease in the real Ruble value of the for-
eign currency stock held by the population.
Table 6.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in the real per capita con-
sumption of the population.
Sample: February 94 – December 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables were taken in logarithms and seasonally adjusted before differentia-
tion. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Variable Coefficient
Constant term   0.006
 (0.005)
The month-to-month change in real wages   0.48*
 (0.16)
D (Real exchange rate(–2), 2)   0.18*
 (0.08)
R-squared   0.26
Q-statistic
(20 lags)**
16.65
 (0.68)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — P-value in parentheses.
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4. THE MODEL
The model which we are using for the estimation of the cumulative ef-
fect of the real exchange rate on output is basically the standard AD-AS
static model.
The demand side is described by the following system of equations:
IMEXGICY −+++= ;
),(/ YiLPM = ;
),( TYrCC −= ;
)(YTT = ;
),( RrII = ;
)/,( PPTGG yelectricit= ;
)(REXREX ph×= ;
),( RYIMRIM ph×= ;
eir π−= ;
PPER /∗= ;
0,0;0;0,0;0,0 <<>><><
− RrYTYrYi IITCCLL ;
0,0;0;0,0 / <>>>> RYRPPT IMIMEXGG yelectricit ;
where:
Y — output,
C — consumption,
I — investment,
G — government induced demand,
EX — export of goods and services (real ruble value),
IM — import of goods and services (real ruble value),
EXph— export of goods and services (physical volumes),
IMph — import of goods and services (physical volumes),
M — nominal money balances,
P — domestic price level,
T — net taxes,
L — demand for money function,
i — nominal interest rate,
r — real interest rate,
R — real exchange rate,
Pelectricity — domestic price of electricity,
P* — foreign price level,
E — nominal exchange rate,
πe inflation expectations.
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The first and the second equation of the system are equilibrium condi-
tions for the goods and the money market respectively.
The third equation relates consumption to the real interest rate and to
disposable income. Consumption depends positively on disposable in-
come and negatively on the real interest rate, which may be interpreted
as either the price of credit or the opportunity cost of consumption to-
day as opposed to saving. Disposable income is equal to real GDP mi-
nus the net taxes collected by consolidated budget and extra-budgetary
funds.
The fourth equation relates net taxes to GDP. Thus, the model does not
take into account other factors (for example, the political ones) which
determine tax collection and payment, as well as the non-payment of
pensions, stipends and so on.
The fifth equation says that investment depends negatively on the real
interest rate (which is the price of credit) and also on the real exchange
rate, reflecting the price of imported investment goods.
Government-induced demand is assumed to depend both on net taxes
and the real domestic price of electricity. First of all, in Russia, govern-
ment-induced demand is not necessarily actually paid and, thus, is not
equal to actual consolidated budget non-interest expenditures. The
services of under-financed government institutions enter GDP in accor-
dance with costs, which include wages, heating and electricity (whether
paid or unpaid). The paid part of government-induced demand is posi-
tively related to net taxes. At the same time, government consumption
(both paid and unpaid) increases with the real price of electricity since
costs are higher.
Exports are positively related to the real exchange rate, which is the
measure of the competitiveness of domestic goods against foreign
ones.
The physical volume of imports is an increasing function of output and a
decreasing function of the real exchange rate. The real Ruble value of
spending on imported goods is an increasing function of output, but the
effect of the real exchange rate is unclear here. Growth in the real ex-
change rate leads to a decrease in the number of units imported but to
an increase in the real price of each unit.
The two last equations are definitions of the real interest rate and the
real exchange rate.
The solution of the system gives us aggregate demand as a function of
the real money balances, the real electricity price, the real exchange
rate and inflation expectations, which we assume to have a loglinear
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form:
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Note that the effect of the real exchange rate on aggregate demand is
unclear, for the reasons stated above.
Aggregate supply is assumed to be a function of real non-wage pro-
ducer costs and inflation expectations. Inflation expectations could in-
crease supply due to an increase in profit expectations and a decrease
in the real lending rate, which is the cost of working capital. On the
other hand, they could influence supply negatively since producers
could consider high inflation as a sign of a deteriorating economic situa-
tion. Real producer costs are determined not only by the domestic
prices of fuel and energy but also by the price of imported components,
which is assumed to depend on the real exchange rate.
Thus, aggregate supply is a function of the real domestic prices of fuel
and energy, the real exchange rate and inflation expectations:
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The sign of 4b  is uncertain.
Using the equilibrium condition
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we can exclude P and develop a reduced form of output equation:
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The impact of the real exchange rate, inflation expectations and the real
electricity price on equilibrium output is uncertain.
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5. MODEL ESTIMATION
We need to estimate the equilibrium output equation (4.4) as well as the
demand and supply equations (4.1) and (4.2).
Inflation expectations are proxied by the second lag of inflation.
On the basis of the ADF tests, we conclude that all variables which enter
(4.1), (4.2) and (4.4), except real GDP and the domestic electricity price
in terms of fuel, are I(1). The real GDP and the domestic electricity price
in terms of fuel turned out to be stationary. Thus, we differentiated all
the estimations. The results of the ADF tests are given in Appendix V.
We estimate the reduced form equation by OLS, using TSLS to estimate
the demand and supply equations but also estimating these by OLS for
comparison.
We have not carried out a seasonal adjustment of the series, assuming
that the seasonality in real output is explained mainly by seasonality in
the explanatory variables, although we did add a dummy variable for
January to the set of explanatory variables.
Table 7 contains the results of the estimation of the reduced form equa-
tion.
The coefficient of the change in the real exchange rate is negative and
statistically significant at the 10% level.
We then estimated the structural equations in the differentiations by
TSLS and OLS (Tables 8, 9).
Following Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), we tested jointly for the
correctness of the model specification and the validity of the instru-
ments. The test statistic is the number of observations multiplied by the
uncentred R-squared of the regression of the TSLS residuals on the set
of instruments. The test statistic is asymptotically chi-squared with (l–k)
degrees of freedom, where l is the number of instruments and k is the
number of explanatory variables. For our demand equation, the test sta-
tistic is virtually zero (0.00), so we could accept the hypothesis at the
10% level of significance.
Thus, we did not discover a statistically significant influence of the real
exchange rate on the demand side. This result is consistent with our
findings in Sections 2 and 3.
Again for our supply equation, we tested jointly for the correctness of
the model specification and the validity of the instruments. The test sta-
tistic is equal to 1.24; thus, we can accept the hypothesis at the 10%
level of significance.
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Here, we found that the real depreciation had a negative effect on the
supply side which was statistically significant at the 10% level of signifi-
cance. The coefficient on the second lag of inflation (by which we prox-
ied inflation expectations) is positive and statistically significant at the
5% level of significance. The result probably needs the construction of
an underlying micromodel and further research.
Precautions in interpretation. In this section, we would like to sum-
marise what precautions are necessary in interpreting the results of the
paper.
First of all, since we were not able to prove the existence of co-
integrating relationships between the studied variables, all our results
are formulated in terms of stationary differences.
Table 7.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in real GDP.
Sample: February 93 – November 1997.
Method of estimation: OLS.
All variables (except inflation) are taken in logarithms before differentiation. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Variable Coefficient
Constant term   0.01
 (0.00)
fuelP
M
D   0.14*
 (0.07)
))2(inf(−D   0.01*
 (0.00)
fuelP
EP
D
∗
–0.10**
 (0.06)
fuel
yelectricit
P
P
D
  0.07
 (0.05)
 January –0.21*
 (0.02)
 R-squared   0.83
 Q-statistic
 (24 lags)***
29.14
 (0.22)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — Significant at the 10% level of significance.
*** — P-value in parentheses.
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Table 8. Demand equation.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in real GDP.
Sample: February 93 – November 1997.
Method of estimation: TSLS and OLS.
List of instruments: constant term, 
fuelP
M
D , D(inf(–2)), D(inf(–1)), 
fuelP
EP
D
∗
,
fuel
yelectricit
P
P
D , January.
All variables (except inflation) are taken in logarithms before differentiation. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Variable
TSLS OLS
Constant term  0.02*
(0.00)
 0.02*
(0.00)
P
M
D
 0.32*
(0.11)
 0.26*
(0.08)
D(inf(–2))  0.01*
(0.00)
 0.01*
(0.00)
P
EP
D
∗  0.05
(0.09)
 0.01
(0.06)
P
P
D yelectricit
 0.21*
(0.10)
 0.15*
(0.06)
January –0.20*
 (0.00)
–0.20*
 (0.02)
R-squared   0.85   0.85
Q-statistic
(24 lags)**
17.09
 (0.85)
22.69
 (0.54)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — P-value in parentheses.
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Table 9. Supply equation.
Dependent variable: The month-to-month change in real GDP.
Sample: February 93 – November 1997.
Method of estimation: TSLS and OLS.
List of instruments: constant term, 
fuelP
M
D , D(inf(–2)), D(inf(–1)), 
fuelP
EP
D
∗
,
fuel
yelectricit
P
P
D , January.
All variables (except inflation) are taken in logarithms before differentiation. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
TSLS
Variable
Regression 1 Regression 2
OLS
Constant term   0.012*
 (0.006)
  0.012*
 (0.006)
  0.02*
 (0.00)
P
EP
D
∗ –0.19***
 (0.13)
–0.18**
 (0.09)
–0.00
 (0.07)
D(inf(–2))   0.01*
 (0.00)
  0.01*
 (0.00)
  0.01*
 (0.00)
P
P
D fuel
–0.17**
 (0.09)
–0.17*
 (0.08)
–0.02
 (0.06)
P
P
D yelectricit
–0.02
 (0.10)
January –0.22*
 (0.02)
–0.22*
 (0.02)
–0.23*
 (0.02)
R-squared   0.76   0.77   0.80
Q-statistic
(24 lags)****
31.16
( 0.15)
30.71
 (0.16)
34.49
 (0.08)
* — Significant at the 5% level of significance.
** — Significant at the 10% level of significance.
*** — Significant at the 15% level of significance.
**** — P-value in parentheses.
REAL APPRECIATION AND OUTPUT: RUSSIA 1993–199738
If the levels are not co-integrated, then we can not expect that the vari-
ables will satisfy any relationship, even in the long run. At the same
time, the stable differences could well satisfy some equilibrium equation.
Thus, all the connections which we discovered do have a place for
month-to-month adjustments to short-run shocks. On the other hand, at
this stage we can say nothing about the relationships between the levels
of the variables.
Second, it is necessary to mention that, within the time period studied
(1993–1997), we mainly observed a month-to-month real appreciation,
not a depreciation. Simply reversing the results of the paper to explain a
connection between a real depreciation and output could lead to the
wrong conclusions. That is why, in the case of a real depreciation, one
should not apply the results of the paper without further research.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our estimations show that, in 1993–1997, the larger month-to-month
real appreciation was connected with the larger month-to-month in-
crease in aggregate supply (supposedly due to the stronger decrease in
the prices of imported production inputs). At the same time, according
to our estimations, the short-term adjustments of aggregate demand
were insensitive to the month-to-month real appreciation.
Our results allow us to suggest that the sharp contraction of output
soon after 17 August 1998 was caused by the sharp real depreciation in
that August and September. Another conjecture suggested by the paper
is that the recovery of output after several months of contraction was
due to the increase in real money holdings. This increase in real money
demand we attribute to the disappeared GKO/OFZ market. However, the
explanation of the post-crisis dynamics of real GDP need to be verified
thoroughly.
We found no evidence that short-run changes in the physical volume of
crude oil exports to CIS countries were influenced negatively by the
month-to-month real appreciation. The same statement is true for
natural gas exports both to non-CIS and to CIS countries. However, the
revaluation effect of the real appreciation, which decreased the profits
of exporters, certainly had a place. On the other hand, the larger short-
run increase in the real price of crude oil exported to non-CIS countries
led to a greater increase in the physical volume of non-CIS crude oil ex-
ports.
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We have no evidence that the month-to-month real appreciation in-
creased the short-run changes in the physical volumes of meat and
white sugar imports. The revaluation effect of the real appreciation,
which made every imported unit cheaper and, thus, increased real do-
mestic incomes, could not be harmful to the demand for domestically-
produced goods. On the other hand, the additional short-run increase in
non-CIS meat imports crowded out a part of the increase in domestic
meat production. That is, the month-to-month increase in domestic pro-
duction suffered from the short-run increase in import volumes, but not
from the real appreciation.
Thus, we have no evidence that the cumulative effect of the month-to-
month real appreciation on the changes in the net export part of aggre-
gate demand was definitely negative. So, our findings in Section 2 are
consistent with our main results in Section 5.
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APPENDICES
I. Coefficients of the correlations of the price of crude
oil exports to CIS and to non-CIS countries
II. Coefficients of the correlations of the domestic price
of natural gas and the price at which natural gas is
exported to non-CIS and CIS countries
Sample: March 95 – December 1997.
All variables are changes of seasonally-adjusted logarithms.
A A (–1) A (–2) A (–3)
B   0.13 0.06 0.29 –0.05
B (–1)   0.03 0.16 0.08   0.26
B (–2)   0.11 0.05 0.04   0.04
B (–3) –0.03 0.09 0.10   0.06
A — 
P
Ep CISnon ×−$ ; B — 
P
EpCIS ×$ .
Sample: April 94 – December 1997.
All variables are changes of seasonally adjusted logarithms.
A A (–1) A(–2) B B (–1) B (–2)
A   0.00 –0.09   0.16
A (–1)   0.21   0.10 –0.13
A (–2) –0.04 –0.18   0.23
B   0.00   0.21 –0.04
B (–1) –0.09   0.10 –0.18
B (–2)   0.16 –0.13   0.23
C –0.09   0.04   0.30 –0.09   0.07 –0.03
C (–1) –0.18 –0.08   0.01 –0.12   0.11 –0.05
C (–2) –0.22 –0.18 –0.07 –0.25 –0.03   0.08
A — 
P
Ep CISnon ×−$ ; B — 
P
EpCIS ×$ ; C — 
P
Epdom × .
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III. Results of ADF tests (exports)
Variable SA S NL TS 1% Q P
Physical
volume of
crude oil
exports:
Non-CIS:
Level + 03.92–07.98 1 –3.15 –3.52 13.63 0.63
Difference + 06.92–07.98 3 –6.36 –3.52 14.74 0.54
CIS:
Level + 04.94–06.98 2 –1.76 –3.56 8.56 0.93
Difference + 05.94–06.98 2 –6.19 –3.57 9.94 0.87
Real export
price of crude
oil (free of
taxes):
Non-CIS:
Level + 12.92–06.98 2 –2.78 –3.53 15.43 0.49
Difference + 01.93–06.98 2 –4.7 –3.53 16.87 0.39
CIS:
Level + 04.94–06.98 2 –1.45 –3.57 19.53 0.24
Difference + 05.94–06.98 1 –7.23 –3.57 19.20 0.26
Domestic
extraction of
crude oil:
Level + 04.93–07.98 2 –3.71 –3.53 8.90 0.92
Physical
volume of
natural gas
exports:
Non-CIS:
Level + 05.92–12.97 3 –1.39 –3.53 15.35 0.50
Difference + 05.92–12.97 2 –8.74 –3.53 15.61 0.48
CIS:
Level + 03.94–12.97 1 –4.53 –3.58 0.54 0.54
SA — Seasonal adjustment; S — Sample; NL — Number of lags (ADF); TS — ADF
test statistic; 1% — 1% critical value; Q — Q-statistic (16 lags); P — P-value.
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Variable SA S NL TS 1% Q P
Real export
price of
natural gas
(free of
taxes):
Non-CIS:
Level + 11.93–12.97 2 –2.23 –3.56 17.69 0.34
Difference + 11.93–12.97 1 –4.42 –3.57 19.91 0.22
CIS:
Level – 06.94–12.97 2 –1.66 –3.59 12.93 0.68
Difference – 07.94–12.97 2 –4.04 –3.59 11.72 0.76
Real domes-
tic price of
natural gas:
Level – 03.94–12.97 2 –2.64 –3.58 10.09 0.86
Difference – 04.94–12.97 2 –3.31 –3.58 7.75 0.96
Second
difference
– 05.94–12.97 2 –4.8 –3.59 11.48 0.88
Domestic
extraction of
natural gas:
Level + 03.94–07.98 2 –2.47 –3.53 12.53 0.71
Difference + 03.94–07.99 2 –4.52 –3.54 12.71 0.69
SA — Seasonal adjustment; S — Sample; NL — Number of lags (ADF); TS — ADF
test statistic; 1% — 1% critical value; Q — Q-statistic (16 lags); P — P-value.
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IV. Results of ADF tests (imports)
Variable SA S NL TS 1% Q P
Physical vol-
ume of meat
imports:
Non-CIS:
Level – 04.92–08.98 2 –1.97 –3.52 13.72 0.69
Difference – 05.92–08.98 2 –5.34 –3.52 15.25 0.51
CIS:
Level – 04.94–07.98 2 –2.39 –3.57 20.54 0.20
Difference – 05.94–07.98 2 –5.85 –3.58 10.76 0.82
Real import
price of meat
(taxes added):
Non-CIS:
Level – 04.92–07.98 2 –1.81 –3.52 17.42 0.36
Difference – 05.92–07.98 2 –4.56 –3.52 16.00 0.45
CIS:
Level – 04.94–12.97 2 –3.12 –3.60   6.20 0.99
Difference – 05.94–12.97 2 –5.59 –3.61   7.25 0.99
Domestic
production of
meat:
Level – 05.93–07.98 3 –1.78 –3.54 20.12 0.22
Difference – 05.93–07.98 3 –5.56 –3.54 19.48 0.25
Real domes-
tic price of
meat:
Level – 04.94–07.98 2 –1.18 –3.56   3.89 0.99
Difference – 05.94–07.98 2 –3.94 –3.56   3.98 1.00
SA — Seasonal adjustment; S — Sample; NL — Number of lags (ADF); TS — ADF
test statistic; 1% — 1% critical value; Q — Q-statistic (16 lags); P — P-value.
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Variable SA S NL TS 1% Q P
Physical
volume of
white sugar
imports:
Total:
Level – 04.95–07.98 2 –1.50 –3.60 18.22 0.31
Difference – 05.95–07.98 2 –5.34 –3.61 18.90 0.27
Non-CIS:
Level + 04.92–08.98 2 –1.73 –3.52 10.91 0.82
Difference + 05.92–08.98 2 –4.62 –3.52   8.17 0.94
CIS:
Level – 04.95–07.98 2 –1.25 –3.60 13.01 0.67
Difference – 04.95–07.98 2 –4.72 –3.61 16.34 0.43
Real import
price of white
sugar (taxes
added):
Non-CIS:
Level – 04.92–07.98 2 –2.46 –3.52 13.01 0.67
Difference – 05.92–07.98 2 –5.58 –3.52   7.74 0.96
CIS:
Level – 02.95–07.98 0 –4.18 –3.63   7.65 0.96
Domestic
production of
white sugar:
Level + 03.93–07.98 1 –3.59 –3.53 14.22 0.58
SA — Seasonal adjustment; S — Sample; NL — Number of lags (ADF); TS — ADF
test statistic; 1% — 1% critical value; Q — Q-statistic (16 lags); P — P-value.
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V. Results of ADF tests (model)
Variable SA S NL TS 1% Q P
Real GDP:
Level + 05.93–07.98 3 –4.07 –3.54 10.35 0.85
Real M2:
Level – 05.92–07.98 3 –1.53 –3.52 18.30 0.31
Difference – 05.92–07.98 2 –5.25 –3.52 18.81 0.28
Real exchange
rate:
Level – 03.92–06.98 1 –2.19 –3.52 20.03 0.22
Difference – 04.92–06.98 1 –5.58 –3.52 19.62 0.24
Real price of
electricity:
Level – 11.93–07.98 10 –3.36 –3.55 16.75 0.40
Difference – 08.93–07.98 6 –5.47 –3.54 17.05 0.38
Real price of
fuel:
Level – 02.93–07.98 1 –2.68 –3.53 18.34 0.30
Difference – 03.93–07.98 1 –6.99 –3.53 15.45 0.49
Inflation:
Level – 05.92–07.98 2 –1.74 –3.52 13.28 0.65
Difference – 06.92–07.98 2 –6.07 –3.52 14.79 0.54
M2 in terms
of fuel:
Level – 04.93–07.98 3 –2.97 –3.53 13.78 0.62
Difference – 04.93–07.98 2 –5.21 –3.53 13.85 0.61
Exchange
rate in terms
of fuel:
Level – 05.93–06.98 4 –2.77 –3.54 16.72 0.40
Difference – 02.93–06.98 0 –6.42 –3.53 17.15 0.38
Electricity
price in terms
of fuel:
Level – 07.93–07.98 6 –3.69 –3.54 18.55 0.29
SA — Seasonal adjustment; S — Sample; NL — Number of lags (ADF); TS — ADF
test statistic; 1% — 1% critical value; Q — Q-statistic (16 lags); P — P-value.
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VI. Results of Granger causality tests (exports of crude oil)
All variables are changes of logarithms.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
69 2.65* 1.96** 3.02*
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
51 1.77 0.86 0.82
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
51 1.57 1.97*** 2.58* 2.25*
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
51 1.69 1.21 0.85
D(Extraction) does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
66 0.94 0.63 0.70
D(Extraction) does not
Granger-cause CISVD
53 0.98 0.67 0.41
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
69 1.73 1.55 1.55
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
51 1.49 0.96 1.33
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause 
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
51 1.05 0.54 0.73
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
** — Rejection at the 10% level of significance.
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
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VII. Results of Granger causality tests (exports of natural gas)
All variables are changes of logarithms.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations 4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
52 0.46 0.28 0.36
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
45 0.58 0.52 0.50
All variables are changes of logarithms.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
51 1.39    1.38 1.31
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause D(Extraction)
66  3.51*   3.30* 3.54*
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause D(Extraction)
53 0.70 1.02 0.63
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
51 0.75 0.83 1.48
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
51 1.14 1.20 1.46
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
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All variables are changes of logarithms.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations 4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
47 0.40 0.82 0.62
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
45 0.31 0.21 0.40
D(Extraction) does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
59   3.22* 2.42** 2.19**
D(Extraction) does not
Granger-cause CISVD
47   2.82* 2.22** 1.73
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
52 0.30 0.42 0.93
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
45 1.63 1.44 1.31
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause 
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
47 0.84 0.60 0.55
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
45 1.41 1.35 0.40
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause D(Extraction)
59 1.76 1.32 1.08
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
** — Rejection at the 10% level of significance.
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VIII. Results of Granger causality tests (imports of meat)
All variables are changes of logarithms.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations 4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
CISVD does not Granger-
cause D(Extraction)
47 0.06 0.43 0.58
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
45 0.91 0.92 2.07**
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause 
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
45 1.08 0.81 1.38
** — Rejection at the 10% level of significance.
All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP is seasonally-adjusted.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
78 1.96*** 1.45 0.83
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
41 0.26 0.23 0.44
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$ does not
Granger-cause CISVD
48 0.46 0.51 0.22
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
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All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP is seasonally-adjusted.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations 4 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
41 0.17 0.12 0.69
D(Domestic production)
does not Granger-cause
CISnonVD −
66 0.49 0.83 0.64
D(Domestic production)
does not Granger-cause
CISVD
48 0.38 0.41 0.88
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
78 3.20* 2.36* 2.16**
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
41 0.52 0.41 0.95
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause 
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$
48 3.23* 1.93*** 1.72
CISVD  does not
Granger-cause
P
EP
D
CIS ×$
41 3.18* 2.73* 2.33**
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause
D(Domestic production)
66 2.27** 2.27** 1.87***
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
** — Rejection at the 10% level of significance.
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
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IX. Results of Granger causality tests (imports of sugar)
All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP is seasonally-adjusted.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags 7 lags
CISVD  does not
Granger-cause
D(Domestic production)
48 0.86 0.82 0.55
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause D(Y)
66 0.86 1.04 1.78*** 2.41*
D(Y) does not Granger-
cause CISnonVD −
66 2.98* 3.12* 3.92*
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP and domestic production are
seasonally-adjusted.
Hypothesis Number of
observations 4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
78 0.52 0.68 0.40
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISnonVD −
35 0.39 1.99***
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
42 0.30 0.61 0.64
P
EP
D
CIS ×$  does not
Granger-cause CISVD
35 0.42 0.70
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
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All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP and domestic production are
seasonally-adjusted.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
P
EP
D
CISNon ×−$  does not
Granger-cause D(V)
42 1.00 1.70 1.31
P
EP
D
CIS ×$ does not
Granger-cause D(V)
35 0.89 0.78
D(Domestic production)
does not Granger-cause
CISnonVD −
66 1.76 1.44 1.46
D(Domestic production)
does not Granger-cause
CISVD
42 1.26 0.75 1.16
D(Domestic production)
does not Granger-cause
D(V)
42 0.92 0.65 1.17
CISnonVD − does not
Granger-cause D(Domestic
production)
66 0.74 0.67 0.85
CISVD  does not
Granger-cause D(Domestic
production)
42 0.80 1.41 0.90
D(V) does not Granger-
cause D(Domestic produc-
tion)
42 0.40 1.00 1.12
CISnonVD −  does not
Granger-cause D(Y)
66 0.33 0.22 0.24
CISVD  does not Granger-
cause D(Y)
42 0.23 0.63 0.46
D(V) does not Granger-
cause D(Y)
42 1.37 1.34 1.24
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All variables are changes of logarithms. Real GDP and domestic production are
seasonally-adjusted.
F-statistic (P-value in parenthesis)
Hypothesis Number of
observations
4 lags 5 lags 6 lags
D(Y) does not Granger-
cause CISnonVD −
66 0.64 0.74 0.76
D(Y) does not Granger-
cause CISVD
42 0.46 0.41 0.60
D(Y) does not Granger-
cause D(V)
42 2.75* 2.24** 2.02***
* — Rejection at the 5% level of significance.
** — Rejection at the 10% level of significance.
*** — Rejection at the 15% level of significance.
REAL APPRECIATION AND OUTPUT: RUSSIA 1993–199754
REFERENCES
Arida P., and L. Taylor (1989), "Short-run Macroeconomics", Handbook of De-
velopment Economics, 2:855–884.
Barro, R.J. (1995), "Inflation and economic growth", Working paper series, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Buffie E. (1984), "Financial repression, the new structuralists and stabilization
policy in semi-industrialized countries", Journal of Development Economics,
14:305–322.
Buffie E. (1986), "Devaluation, investment and growth in LDCs", Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 20:361–380.
Campbell J.Y., and P. Perron (1991), "Pitfalls and opportunities: What macroeco-
nomists should know about unit roots", National Bureau of Economic Research,
Macroeconomics conference, Cambridge, February 1991.
Davidson R., and J.G. MacKinnon (1993), "Estimation and Inference in Econo-
metrics", Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
Diaz-Alejandro C.F. (1963), "A note on the impact of devaluation and distributive
effect", Journal of Political Economy, 71:577–580.
Dickey D.A., and W.A. Fuller (1981), "Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive
time series with a unit root", Econometrica, 49:1057–1072.
Engle R.F., and C.W.J. Granger (1987), "Co-integration and error correction:
Representation, estimation and testing", Econometrica, 55:251–276.
Grafe C., and C. Wyplosz (1996), "A ‘Pocket’ Model of the Emerging Russian
Macroeconomy", Working Paper Series, Russian-European Centre for Economic
Policy.
Granger C.W.J., and P. Newbold (1974), "Spurious regressions in econometrics",
Journal of Econometrics, 2:111–120.
Granville B., Dynnikova O., and O. Larichev (1996), "Monetary and Financial Re-
port – April 1996", RECEP.
Hirschman A.O. (1949), "Devaluation and the Trade Balance: A Note", Review of
Economic and Statistics, 31:50–53.
Karras G. (1993), "Money, Inflation and Output Growth: Does the Aggregate De-
mand – Aggregate Supply Model Explain the International Evidence?", Journal of
the Kiel Institute of World Economics, 662–674.
Krugman P. and L. Taylor (1978), "Contractionary effects of devaluation", Journal
of International Economics, 8:445–456.
Obstfeld M. (1982), "Aggregate Spending and the Terms of Trade: Is There a
Laursen–Metzler Effect?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97(2):251–270.
REFERENCES 55
Person T., and Svensson L. E.-O. (1985), "Current Account Dynamics and the
Terms of Trade: Harberger–Laursen–Metzler Two Generations Later", Journal of
Political Economy, 93(1):43–65.
Sargan J.D., and Bhargava A. (1983) "Testing the residuals from least squares
regression for being generated by the Gaussian random walk", Econometrica,
51:153–174.
Solimano A. (1986), "Contractionary devaluation in the Southern cone: Chile",
Journal of Development Economics, 23:135–152.
Svensson L. E.-O. and Razin A. (1983) "The Terms of Trade and the Current Ac-
count: Harberger–Laursen–Metzler Effect", Journal of Political Economy,
91(1):97–125.
Van Wijnbergen S. (1986), "Exchange rate management and stabilization policies
in developing countries", Journal of Development Economics, 23:227–248.
Wyplosz C., and Halpern L. (1996) "Equilibrium exchange rates in transition
economies", Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, No. 125.
Àëåêïåðîâ Â.Þ. (1996), "Âåðòèêàëüíî èíòåãðèðîâàííûå íåôòÿíûå êîìïàíèè
Ðîññèè", Ìîñêâà.
